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CT 
On 11 June 1996 the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Reform Act") 
came into effect, bringing with it dramatic changes to the resolution of 
parenting disputes under the Family Law Act 1975 ("the Act"). The Reform 
Act essentially reworks Part VII of the Act, which deals exclusively with 
children. While changes have also been made in the areas of family violence 
(the new terminology for domestic violence) 1 and primary dispute resolution 
(the phrase adopted in place of alternative dispute resolution),2 it is the 
abolition of the guardianship I custody I access regime and the introduction 
of parenting plans that form the centrepiece of the new regime. This comment 
outlines briefly those aspects of Part VII and looks at how women might be 
affected by these changes. 
1 In particular, see Division 11 of Part VII. 
2 While this is dealt with in Part III of the Act, it clearly has significant 
implications for matters arising under Part VIL 
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THE OBIECT OF THE EXERCISE 
To understand this new regime, one must start by considering the objects 
section inserted at the commencement of Part VII. Section 608(1) states that 
the 
"object of this Part is to ensure that children receive adequate and 
proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential, and to 
ensure that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their 
responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of 
their children."3 
The principles underlying these objects are also made explicit, namely, that 
® children have a right to know, and be cared for, by both parents, 
" children have a right to regular contact with both parents and with 
other significant people 
" parents share their duties and responsibilities towards their children, 
and 
" parents should agree on the future parenting of their children4 
In framing this section, the drafters have drawn heavily on certain articles in 
the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child ("the 
Convention")5 In fact, the Convention was specifically referred to in an 
early draft of the Reform Act. 
Despite the Act being silent on the question, it has been suggested that all 
other sections in Part VII must be read subject to s60B6 There are, however, 
compelling arguments against this interpretation. For example, the legislative 
3 s 608(1). All sections referred to are from the Family Law Act unless specified 
otherwise. 
4 s 608(2). 
5 In particular, see Articles 7.1 and 9.3. 
6 Family Law Council, National Seminar Series on the Family Law Reform Act 
Handbook, March 1996 at 26. 
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failure to make s60B a mandatory consideration is in stark contrast to the 
approach taken to, say, s68T? It is also hard to see how the best interests 
principle8 can be subject to the new objects section.9 The 'underlying 
principles' (which really provide the meat on the bones of s 608) are 
expressly made subject to the child's best interests. Moreover, s65E states 
the general principle that the child's best interests are the paramount10 
consideration in the making of any parenting order. Thus, in the exceptional 
instances where this is not to be the case, that is where s65E does not apply, 
this has been made explicit.11 
To some extent this new objects section really makes patent principles that 
were already being applied by the Family Court in determining what was in 
a child's best interests. For example, the notion that contact with both 
parents is a right of the child (not the parent), and that such contact should 
be promoted, is well established in the caselaw.12 Judicial recognition of the 
important role that the wider family can play in a child's upbringing has 
also been a feature of recent cases, particularly in relation to 
grandparents.13 In a more general sense, however, the objects section will 
no doubt provide a useful tool for legislative interpretation and will 
promote the already emerging trend towards the protection of children's 
rights in the Family Court. Whether it will form the basis for any revolution 
is less certain. 
7 This section makes it mandatory to consider the stated purposes of Division 11 
when making an order under s 68T. 
8 This is the principle that the paramount consideration in the making of all 
parenting orders shall be the best interests of the child: s 65E. Prior to the 
Reform Act, this was phrased in terms of the child's 'welfare', rather than 
'best interests'. This change in terminology brings the Act into line with the 
Convention. 
9 Family Law Council, supra, n 6, at 26. 
10 The word "paramount" has previously been interpreted to mean 
"overriding": see the discussion in Dickey, A., Family Law, Law Book Co., 
Sydney, 1990 at 344-346. 
11 See for example s 68T where the Court is directed to have regard to, rather 
than to treat as paramount, the child's best interests. 
12 Brown and Pedersen (1988) FLC 91-967. 
13 Bright and Bright v Bright and Mackley (1995) FLC 92-570. 
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PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARENTING ORDERS 
Part VII of the Act now provides that, subject to any contrary court order, 
both parents of a child have parental responsibility for that child. This joint 
responsibility endures despite any change in the nature of the parents' 
relationship (for example, divorce or separation)14 Parental responsibility 
is defined to mean "all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority 
which, by law, parents have in relation to children"15 
The court can, however, make parenting orders, that is, orders that 
effectively rearrange parental responsibility, or some aspect of it. 16 There 
are three types of parenting orders: residence orders, contact orders and 
specific issues orders.17 As their names suggest, the first essentially deals 
with whom the child shall live and the second with who may have contact 
with the child. A specific issues order can deal with any other aspect 
concerning parental responsibility. The important things to note about 
parenting orders are that: 
e they may be sought by anyone18 
e they replace guardianship, custody and access orders, and 
e except to the extent necessary to give effect to the order, they do not 
diminish the parental responsibility of any other person unless that is 
expressly stipulated 19 
So, what does this all mean to parents about to separate or divorce? Firstly, 
it means that both are intended to have an ongoing role in the rearing of their 
children. Thus, on separation each retains (in theory) full decision-making 
powers in respect of, and responsibility for, the children. If the Family Court 
makes a residence order in favour of one of the parents this decides only 
15 s 61B. 
16 s 65D. 
17 s 648(2). Child maintenance is, of course, also included. 
18 s 65C. This was the case under the old Part VII and both the new and the 
old sections included the child as a potential applicant. 
19 s 61D(2). 
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where the child shall live: the non-residential parent otherwise retains full 
parental responsibility. Equally, a contact order does not diminish the 
parental responsibility of the residential parent during the period of contact. 
If there is any other matter on which the parents cannot agree, they can 
obtain a specific issues order to resolve it. 
PARENTING PLANS 
Under the old Part VII, parties could enter into a child agreement if they 
wished to put into writing their parenting arrangements. Such agreements 
could be registered with the Family Court, and would then have had the force 
of a court order. Typically, child agreements resembled consent orders, that 
is, they dealt with the legal aspects of parenting: guardianship, custody and 
access. In place of child agreements the Reform Act has introduced parenting 
plans.20 These too can be registered and given the force of a court order.21 
In fact, to the extent that they deal with residence and contact orders they 
will differ little from child agreements. The question is, however, whether 
they will take on the role suggested by their name, that is, a plan for the 
future parenting of the children. In the discussions leading up to the 
enactment of the final provisions, consideration was given to a style of 
agreement used by marriage guidance organisations. These detailed plans 
allow for the inclusion of a whole host of parenting matters, from education 
decisions to the choice of religion. Technically, these types of decisions could 
have been included in child agreements but generally were not and only time 
will tell if parenting plans evolve in such a way. Interestingly, the drafters 
chose not to include any pro forma plan in the new legislation. 
WHAT'S IN IT FOR WOMEN? 
What, then, do these amendments mean for women involved in parenting 
disputes? While other issues will undoubtedly arise as time goes on, there 
are three matters that immediately spring to mind. The first and most obvious 
cause of concern is the relationship between enduring parental 
20 See Division 4 of Part VII. 
21 ss 63E and 63F. 
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responsibility and residence order�. Will the new regime encourage non­
residential parents to use their enduring pcuental responsibility to disrupt 
the residential household? Secondly, does the commitment in the objects 
section to children having regular contact with both parents mean that 
residential parents will now not be permitted to leave the jurisdicticm7 
Finally, the paper questions the motivation behind the implementation of the 
Reform Act. 
In the past, custodial parents (usually mothers) have assumed the 
responsibility for the day to day care of the child. They have been legally 
entitled to decide what the child would wear, eat, do and so on. The non­
custodial parent was usually a joint guardian and thereby theoretically only 
entitled to participate in long-term decision-making in respect of the child. 
Religion, schooling, major medical decisions and the like fell into this 
category. In reality, there would always have been some custodians who 
encouraged the non-custodial parent's participation in the day to day 
rearing of the child. Conversely, some custodial parents would have resisted 
tooth and nail any incursion into their decision-making domain, whether for 
good reason or because of spite. The theory behind the new provisions is 
that we should encourage the former style of parenting and thus show some 
sort of public commitment to parental co-operation. While it may well be 
that the promotion of genuine parenting plans is a useful step down that 
road, one might justifiably ask whether enduring parental responsibility 
will in fact be the cause of increased parental friction. 
The UK embraced joint and enduring parental responsibility when it passed 
the Children Act. Interestingly, the approach in that jurisdiction has not 
been to interpret that concept so as to allow the use of specific issues orders 
to intervene in the day to day role of the residential parent. That makes 
practical sense, of course. As Bainham noted in the very early days of that 
legislation, "[i]n truth, upbringing will be determined and executed for the 
most part by the residential parent and it requires some intellectual effort to 
regard the parental responsibility of the non-residential parent as anything 
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more than symbolic"22 The upshot is that specific issues orders are used far 
more commonly in the UK to resolve the matters one would historically have 
designated as falling within the guardianship area. It seems that practically, 
then, little has changed in the division of parenting responsibilities in the UK 
as a direct result of these changes. In fact, if one reads the papers there, one 
would not even realise that a new system had been introduced, with recent 
headlines announcing royal arrangements over 'custody' and 'access'. 
It is, of course, early days yet in the Australian interpretation of these 
provisions. If the English experience is anything to go by, we will not see 
non-residential parents able to use their increased status to make the life of 
the residential parent difficult. There are, however, a number of factors that 
might result in a different approach in Australia. The first flows from the 
legal profession rather than the legislation. Is a practitioner negligent if they 
fail to advise their client of the 'dangers' of bare residence and contact 
orders in the face of enduring joint parental responsibility? To avoid any 
such liability it seems practitioners may be encouraging clients to attach to 
these orders a string of specific issues orders dealing with all other 
conceivably contentious issues. Of course, these issues may not have been 
contentious had they not been raised, or perhaps they could have been 
satisfactorily negotiated by the parents themselves as they arose. Now, there 
are two reasons why such orders would probably not be made by a court in 
the UK. The first is that the UK courts have been very eager to leave to the 
parents as much of the responsibility as possible. Of course, this 
privatisation of the law has more to do with cost savings than promoting 
child welfare. Nonetheless, it accounts for the courts' reluctance to grant 
specific issues orders concerning matters of the child's day to day care. The 
second, and related, reason is the no order rule: the court is not permitted to 
make an order where it considers this would not be in the child's best 
interests.23 This has been interpreted at a practical level to mean that if 
parties consent to an arrangement then there is no need for an order. Again, 
22 Bainham, A., Children - The New Law: The Children Act 1989, Jordan & Sons 
Ltd, 1990 at 37. 
23 Children Act1989 s 1 (5). 
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this promotes the type of privatisation sought by the UK legislature. The 
Family Court of Australia has, however, typically adopted a more 
protective role24 It sees itself as the ultimate protector of children's rights25 
and the continued support for registrable parenting plans evidences the 
legislature's and the Court's willingness to stay in the fray. Given that 
approach, perhaps the Family Court will feel itself obliged to take seriously 
the change effected by the new regime. If there really is to be joint and 
enduring parental responsibility then it may be the judiciary will not want 
to discourage non-residential parents from pursuing an active parenting role 
by denying them court access. There is no model to look to, to see where such 
an approach would lead and one can only hope that lawyers will not be the 
big winners out of all of this. 
Freedom of movement may be another area of concern for women as 
residential parents. The objects section at the beginning of Part VII talks of 
the right of children to have regular contact with both parents. Prior to the 
amendments, if a custodial parent had a bona fide and good reason for moving 
(such as the need to accompany a new spouse to a different work location or 
the desire to move close to one's family for support) then the Family Court 
would permit the move26 There has been some suggestion that in light of the 
objects section a different approach is likely to be adopted.27 As this author 
has argued elsewhere, there a number of reasons why that should not be the 
case28 As the only criterion for making such a decision was and remains the 
child's best interests, it is hard to see how the Court can make a dramatic 
about face in this area. Moreover, other jurisdictions with similar (and in 
some cases even more stringent) legislative provisions have not departed 
from the test referred to above29 
24 Dewar, L "The Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) and the Children Act 
1989 (UK) Compared- Twins or Distant Cousins?" (1996) 10 AJFL 18. 
25 Band B (1993) FLC 92-357 at 79,780. 
26 In the Marriage of I and I (1995) FLC 92-604. 
27 Family Law Council, supra, n 6, at 26. 
28 Young, L. "Will Primary Residence Par�nls be as Free to Move as Custodial 
Parents Were?" forthcoming in Atlsimlian Family L.meycr. 
29 ibid. 
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Turning, then, from the specific to the general, it is worth pausing to consider 
the motivation behind the changes contained in the Reform Act. It is 
generally accepted that the primary reasons for the amendments were 
disenchantment with the adversarial win/lose model of custody litigation 
and the perceived disempowerment of non-custodial parents.3° Children, it 
was said, were the victims of this ineffective and unfair system. But who 
was pushing this barrow? Not surprisingly, one often finds that it is the 
interests of those motivating change that are best served by the changes they 
covet. In this case, a driving force in effecting these reforms has been the 
recent and persistent voice of fathers' rights groups.31 Political will, 
motivated as it is by the carrot of election votes, has not been immune to the 
calls for reform generated by these groups. Their impact on recent joint select 
committees is patent. How long did it take Australia to go from an appalling 
record of child support payment (and pitiful levels of support being 
judicially awarded) to one where the vast majority of non-custodial parents 
were meeting this obligation? Conversely, how long did it take legislators to 
heed the calls of those who considered themselves disadvantaged by this new 
system? Before we had time to properly assess the effects of the introduction 
of the child support scheme we were reassessing the levels of payment. Is this 
because we are concerned about the children whose interests lie at the heart 
of child support - or because there are votes to be had in appeasing the 
complainants? Or perhaps those who make the laws feel some affinity for 
the 'people' aggrieved by the child support provisions. A cynic might argue, 
therefore, that there is a connection between the introduction of stricter child 
support laws and the changes contained in the Reform Act. Given that most 
non-custodial parents have recently been forced to make a significant 
contribution to the upkeep of their children, is it surprising that the poor 
treatment of non-custodial parents was subsequently pushed to the fore? Is 
30 See generally Chapter 5, Part 1 of The Family Law Act 1975: Aspects of its 
Operation and Interpretation, AGPS, Canberra, 1992. 
31 For an interesting 'account' of one man's role, see Ian Monk's own 
publication, How I Initiated Three Parliamentary Inquiries into Family Law and 
Reformed our Family Court. 
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it mere coincidence that non-custodial parents seemed to find their voices 
shortly following the discovery of their pockets? 
The possibility that the genesis of the Reform Act was anything other than a 
genuine desire to improve the lot of children should not distract us, however, 
from the potential for positive change the amendments bring. While it may be 
that some non-custodial parents saw these changes as advancing their 
'rights' in respect of their now rather expensive children (although the 
changes are framed in terms of children's rights), it is possible that at the 
same time the interests of children can be well served. As we have seen, one 
of the clearest objectives of the English reforms has been the privatisation of 
child law 32 The goal there seems to have been to delegalise at any cost the 
process of resolving parenting disputes, which brings with it obvious gains 
for the state. The objects section in Part VII of the Australian legislation at 
first glance appears to reflect this trend in that it seeks 'to ensure parents 
fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, 
welfare and development of their children'33 However, this is preceded by 
another object, that of ensuring 'children receive adequate and proper 
parenting to help them achieve their full potential'. When these goals are 
read together, priva tisation seems less central to the new Australian 
philosophy. The prime objective seems rather to improve the developmental 
environment of children. Improving the quality of a child's parenting is, of 
course, a crucial factor in achieving this, and part of the responsibility for 
the quality of parenting lies with the parents themselves. The objects section 
arguably recognises, however, that the state also plays a role in ensuring 
children receive 'adequate and proper parenting'. The state can play an 
important role, for example, in providing parents with the opportunity to 
parent,34 in helping parents reach agreement where there is a parenting 
32 Family Law Council, supra, n 6, at 15. 
33 
s 60B. 
34 The continuation of parental responsibility after divorce and the move away 
from custody I access will hopefully increase the parenting roles of the 'non­
custodial' parent. 
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dispute35 and in protecting parents from violence and abuse so they can fulfil 
their parenting duties.36 So, while the reforms promote active parenting and 
parenting by agreement, hopefully this is not designed simply to divest the 
state of its responsibilities but rather reflects the state's recognition of the 
pivotal role that parents play in a child's development. 
While women should welcome a clear commitment by the state to co­
operative parenting, as this note has shown, they should at the same time be 
cautious about its implementation through the Reform Act. The parenting 
(gender?) war currently being fought through the Family Court focuses on the 
gains and losses for the parents involved at the time of separation. However, 
a society that inequitably divides parenting, whether before or after 
separation, needs to rethink the fundamentals. One cannot expect the Family 
Court to independently revolutionise parenting practices. The difficulties 
that the Court faces in this area stem in part from the fact that cohabiting 
couples do not, as a rule, evenly divide parenting responsibilities - just as 
they do not evenly divide out-of-home work. So long as State and 
Commonwealth governments fail to adequately address the inequitable 
division of parenting during cohabitation, the Family Court will continue to 
be a convenient scapegoat for the problems parents experience in dividing 
this role after separation. 
35 See for example the Act's provisions on counselling, primary dispute 
resolution and parenting plans. 
36 See for example the Act's provisions on family violence orders and the best 
interests checklist. Of course, the provision of adequate funding to provide 
resources for families to avoid, rather than bandaid, family crisis would be a 
good thing too. 
